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I. Introduction
It is 12:03 a.m. on June 25, 1993, and Randy Ertman waits
anxiously for his daughter to arrive home. She is late for her
curfew and perhaps her father believes she has lost track of time
while attending a pool party at a friend's house. As the minutes
tick by turning into hours and then days, Randy Ertman's anxiety
evolves into panic over the disappearance of his daughter. It
would be another four days before her body is found, followed by
an excruciating fifteen years until her father finally receives the
closure he had awaited ever since the night she disappeared.
On the evening of June 24, 1993, Jose Ernesto Medellin, a
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Mexican national who had lived in the United States since the age
of three,' was participating in a gang initiation when two young
teenage girls came upon him and the five other participating men.2
As the girls tried to pass, they were abducted, raped, and
eventually killed.3 After being turned in by a brother of one of the
participating men,4 Medellin was tried, convicted of capital
murder, and sentenced to death.5  Throughout his appellate
process, Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, to which the United States is a signatory, required local
authorities to inform him, as a foreign national prisoner being held
on criminal charges, of his right to speak with a diplomat from his
country.6 Since he was denied this right, Mexico sued the United
States in the World Court (formerly the International Court of
Justice) and obtained a judgment directing the United States to
reopen and reassess the case against Medellin.7 President Bush
intervened with a Presidential memo instructing the Texas courts
to reconsider Medellin's conviction.8 Finding that World Court
decisions were not binding on domestic courts, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals refused the President's request.9 In October
2007, the case came before the United States Supreme Court,
which sided with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, finding
that the Texas judicial system was not directly bound by foreign
1 Associated Press, Mexican-born Texas Death Row Inmate Jose Medellin Set to
Die, DENTON REc. CHRON., Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.dentonrc.com/sharedcontent/dws/
news/texassouthwest/stories/080508dntexexecution. I b21 fd3.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2009).
2 Melissa Underwood, Father of Murdered Girl Questions Bush's Support to Halt
Killer's Execution, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,300686,00.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
3 Id.
4Id.
5 Medellin v. Cockrell, No. H-01-4078, 2003 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 27339, *3 (S.D.
Tex. June 25, 2003).
6 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Mexican Death Row
Inmate, N.Y. TIMEs, May 1, 2007, at A16.
7 Id.
8 George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Feb. 28, 2005,
available at http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/2005-03-10 Avena-compliance.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum].




Given the weight and magnitude of this decision, several
policy arguments have arisen over what this outcome might mean
for the U.S. legal system, both at home and abroad. Specifically,
these arguments have claimed that the United States is in breach of
an international legal obligation that could affect Americans in
foreign custody, forcing them to face proceedings without the
protection of the Vienna Convention and the consular rights it
guarantees." However, there are opposing arguments in favor of
this decision, arguing that it strengthened state criminal laws by
diminishing the influence of foreign affairs on criminal
proceedings. 2 Part II of this Note will explore the facts and
rationale for the Supreme Court's holding in Medellin v. Texas 3.
Part III will examine the background law foreshadowing this case
and Part IV will provide an analysis of the Supreme Court's
opinion and its implications for international law, specifically, as it
applies to the Vienna Convention. Finally, this Note will conclude
in Part V that, although the Supreme Court decision may have
larger unacknowledged ramifications for U.S. prisoners
worldwide, it was intended to protect and insulate state criminal
laws from the influence of foreign affair and policy concerns.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts
On June 24, 1993, fourteen year old Jennifer Ertman and
sixteen year old Elizabeth Pena attended a pool party at a friend's
house, 14 and left when they realized it was getting close to their
curfew.'5 As they walked home together at 11:30 p.m., they
decided to take a shortcut through a park and stumbled across a
group of six gang members who were drinking beers, having just
10 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 170 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2008).
11 Ashby Jones, Looming Texas Execution Gets Spotlight; Mexican Man's Fate
Has Implications in U.S. and Abroad, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2008, at A4.
12 Id.
13 128 S. Ct. 1346, 170 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2008).
14 Sam Howe Verhovek, Houston Knows Murder, But This..., N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1993, at A8.
15 Rosanna Ruiz & Allan Turner, Ertman-Pena Murders Left Lasting Mark on City,
HOUSTON CHRON., May 14, 2006, at Al.
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completed a gang initiation for one of the younger men. 16 As the
girls attempted to pass, Medellin grabbed Pena and forced her
down a hill. Ertman was able to run away but returned upon
hearing the cries of Pena. 7 At that time, the remaining gang
members grabbed Ertman and "for the next hour proceeded to
rape, sodomize and beat the girls before strangling them" to
death.18 Evidence at trial revealed that Medellin participated in the
sexual assault and strangulation of both females. 19 It was noted
during trial that Medellin helped to strangle Pena with one of his
shoe strings2" and strangled Ertman with a "red nylon belt that was
pulled so tight around her throat it snapped in two."21
Additionally, testimony revealed that "the final act of brutality
came when the girl's bodies were stomped on to make sure they
were dead."22
After police received a tip from the brother of one of the
participating gang members, Medellin was arrested and questioned
about the attacks. 23 As he described what happened that evening,
he appeared hyper, giggling as he bragged about "deflowering"
one of the victims, and only showed remorse toward the fact that
he did not have a gun, which would have allowed him to kill Pena
and Ertman more quickly. 24 On September 23, 1993, a Texas jury
found Medellin guilty of capital murder and, in a separate
punishment hearing, the jury opted to impose the death penalty. 25
It is important to note that throughout his arrest, trial, and
conviction, Medellin was never informed that he had the right
under the Vienna Convention of Consular Rights to communicate
with the Mexican consulate, nor informed of his right to seek legal
advice.26 Additionally, Mexico was not informed of his case until
16 Underwood, supra note 2, 15; see also Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at *2.
17 Underwood, supra note 2, 15.
18 Id.
19 Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2.
20 Id.
21 Underwood, supra note 2, 22.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2.
25 Id. at *2-*3.
26 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Medellin wrote to the consulate from death row.27
B. The State Approach to the Vienna Convention Violation
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights
"requires an arresting government to notify a foreign national of
his right to contact his consul., 28 Specifically, the Act states:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals
of the sending State and to have access to them .;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison,
custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-
paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation...
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.29
Following multiple failed appeals3" and several denied
27 Curtis Bradley et al., Medellin v. Dretke: Federalism and International Law, 43
COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 671 (2004-2005).
28 United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001).
29 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes
art. 36, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
30 See Medellin v. State, No. AP-71, 997, slip op. (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 1997)
(unpublished); Ex Parte Medellin, No. WR-50, 190-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2001)
(unpublished).
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applications for writs of habeas corpus,3 Medellin argued that
Texas violated his right to access the Mexican consulate for legal
advice as guaranteed by the Vienna Convention to which both
Mexico and the United States are signatories.32 While Texas
conceded that Medellin was not notified of his right to contact the
Mexican consulate, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas found that Medellin was not entitled to relief for
several reasons.33 First, the court acknowledged the state habeas
court's reasoning that Medellin, as an individual, "lacks standing
to enforce the provisions of the Vienna Convention,"34 looking to
the preamble of the Vienna Convention to support this decision.
The preamble states that the act was "not to benefit individuals but
to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts
on behalf of their respective States. . . ."" The court decided that
if it were to recognize that the Vienna Convention created an
individual right, it would create a new rule of law in violation of
the non-retroactivity principle.36 Second, even if the court were to
overlook the previous argument, Medellin "would [still] have to
show concrete, non-speculative harm for the denial of his consular
rights."37  While Medellin argued that the Mexican Consulate
would have taken immediate action to secure representation and
would have warned him against confession, the state habeas court
found that Medellin failed to show that he was in fact harmed by
the denial of his Vienna Convention rights, despite his lack of
Mexican Consular assistance, having received effective legal
representation and the constitutional protections afforded all
criminal defendants in the State of Texas.38 Third, Medellin failed
to demonstrate that a new trial would be the appropriate remedy
31 See Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4 (discussing denial of
habeas corpus); Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F. 3d at 274.
32 See Vienna Convention, supra note 29, art. 74.
33 Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS at *37.
34 Id. (citing State Habeas Record at 216, p. 15).
35 Vienna Convention, supra note 29, preamble.
36 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court has
determined retroactivity to be a threshold question, which is to be applied in
consideration of the effect of retroactivity on the case at hand as well as to those
similarly situated. Id. at 300-02.
37 Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS at *39.
38 Id. at *39-*40 (citing State Habeas Record at 217, P 16).
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under the Vienna Convention because the act itself failed to
articulate a specific remedy for its violation.39
Following his case against Cockrell, Medellin appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and again
claimed that the state violated the rights guaranteed to him as a
foreign national under the Vienna Convention.' The court found
that this claim failed for two reasons." First, the claim had
procedurally defaulted because Medellin failed to bring it at the
trial stage.42 Medellin argued that the application of the procedural
default rule, itself, violated the Vienna Convention, but the Court,
in examining precedents,43 found that "procedural default rules can
bar Vienna Convention claims."' Second, as stated in Medellin v.
Cockrell, the Vienna Convention, as historically interpreted, does
not confer an individually enforceable right because there is no
private enforcement provision.45
C. The International Approach to the Vienna Convention
Violation
While Medellin struggled in the U.S. courts, the United States
dealt with the same issues on an international level. On January 9,
2003, Mexico brought suit on behalf of fifty-two Mexican-
nationals in the International Court of Justice against the United
States for violating Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Rights. 6  More specifically, Mexico alleged that
although the U.S. authorities who arrested the fifty-two Mexican
nationals involved in the case had enough information at their
disposal to grant them awareness of the foreign nationality of these
39 1d. at *40 n. 17.
40 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d at 274.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 279-80.
43 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 , 375-76 (1998) (holding that inmate's
failure to bring Vienna Convention claim during the trial stage of his criminal
proceedings prevented him from bringing such claim in a subsequent habeas corpus
proceeding).
44 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d at 280.
45 Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *37.
46 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12, 12 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Avena].
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individuals, they failed to inform them of their rights under Article
36, and additionally failed to provide them of this information
"without delay" as demanded by the provision.4 7  Mexico
indicated that consular authorities learned of such arrests and
detentions pertaining to several of the cases involved only after the
death sentence had been imposed through means other than those
provided by the Act." In at least five of the cases, Mexico learned
of the violation after the consulate would have any opportunity to
affect the trials.49
At the close of the hearing, the I.C.J. held that the United
States breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention (1)
"by not informing, without delay upon their detention," the
Mexican nationals of their rights under Article 36;50 (2) "by not
notifying the appropriate Mexican consular post without delay of
the detention" thereby depriving Mexico of the right "to render
assistance to the individuals concerned"; 5 (3) by depriving
Mexico the right to communicate with and have access to those
detained nationals;5 2 and (4) by depriving Mexico the right to
arrange for legal representation of those nationals.5 3 In closing,
the court ruled that the appropriate remedy was for the United
States to review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of
all Mexican nationals named in the case.54
D. The First Appearance before the Supreme Court
Hoping that the Avena decision would force U.S. courts to
finally reach a different judgment, Medellin continued to pursue
appellate avenues and reached the U.S. Supreme Court for the first
time in May 2005."5 While the previous U.S. District Court
decision briefly mentioned the Avena case, 56 it failed to answer the
47 Id. at 13.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 26-27.
50 Id. at 71.
51 Avena, supra note 46, at 71.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 72.
54 Id.
55 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005).
56 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d at 279-80.
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question of whether a federal court was bound by the I.C.J.'s
Avena decision and thus was required to review and reconsider
Medellin's claim under the Vienna Convention without regard to
procedural default rules.57  While the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged that this international question had yet to be
answered, it dismissed the case, finding that Medellin had other
avenues for relief 58
While he had originally described Mexico's suit as "an
unjustified, unwise, and an ultimately unacceptable intrusion in the
United States criminal justice system,"5 9 President Bush issued a
memorandum" announcing that the White House would abide by
the I.C.J.'s decision and would instruct states "to reconsider the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals on death
row."6' Because the memo in conjunction with the Avena
judgment provided him with areas of relief that were not available
at the time of his first state habeas motion, Medellin filed a
successive state habeas motion 62 four days prior to oral arguments
at the Supreme Court. 63  Finding that this successive state
proceeding could provide Medellin with the review and
reconsideration required by the I.C.J. decision, the Supreme Court
dismissed the case. 64
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas heard Medellin's case
and issued an opinion dismissing his application for habeas review
on November 15, 2006.65 While the court acknowledged that it
should give I.C.J. decisions "respectful consideration," it found,
based on precedential authority, that such decisions were not
57 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. at 666.
58 Id. at 666-67. In deciding to dismiss the writ, the Court found that there was a
possibility that the Texas courts would provide Medellin with review and relief under the
Avena judgment and Presidential memorandum. Id. The opinion also acknowledged
that if Medellin failed to receive the relief he desired, there would likely be an additional
opportunity to come before the Supreme Court. Id.
59 Greenhouse, supra note 6 (quoting the Bush Administration).
60 Memorandum, supra note 8.
61 Greenhouse, supra note 6.
62 Ex Parte Medellin, 206 S.W.3d 584 (2005).
63 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005).
64 Id. at 666-67. For further explanation into the Supreme Court's reasoning, see
supra note 58.
65 Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
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binding on state governments.66 Specifically quoting the Supreme
Court's decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,67 the court
acknowledged that "nothing in the structure or purpose of the
I.C.J. suggests that its interpretations were intended to be
conclusive on our courts., 68  Additionally, the court recognized
that the President exceeded his constitutional authority by
intruding in the separate powers independently reserved to the
judiciary.69 Again looking to the decision of Sanchez-Llamas, the
court reiterated the Supreme Court's finding that one of the
powers reserved to the courts is that of defining "the meaning of a
treaty as a matter of federal law."7 Since this power is separately
reserved to the judiciary, "the President cannot dictate to the
judiciary what law to apply or how to interpret the applicable
law."
7 1
E. The Second Appearance before the Supreme Court
Following the Texas Court decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
again granted certiorari to hear Medellin's case.72 Oral arguments
were presented on October 10, 2007, and a decision affirming the
Texas court opinion was handed down on March 25, 2008, holding
that the Avena judgment was not directly enforceable as domestic
law in state courts and that the President's memorandum did not
independently require states to provide review and reconsideration
of those Mexican nationals named in the Avena decision.73
The first issue considered by the court was "whether the Avena
judgment ha[d] automatic domestic legal effect such that the
judgment of its own force applie[d] in state and federal courts."7 4
In determining the appropriate response to this issue, the Court
66 Id. at 332.
67 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
68 Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 331 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548
U.S. 331, 354 (2006)).
69 Id. at 335.
70 Id. (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 354 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
71 Id.
72 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
73 Id. at 1372.
74 Id. at 1356.
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first acknowledged a distinction" among treaties, dividing them
between those that are self-executing and capable of operating on
their own without the aid of any legislative provision, and those
that are not and require additional legislation to carry them into
effect.76 The Court summarized by stating "while treaties may
comprise international commitments. . . they are not domestic law
unless Congress had either enacted implementing statutes or the
treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is
ratified on these terms."" Having found that the Vienna
Convention on Consular Rights was a non-self-executing treaty
and that Congress had yet to advance any specific legislation
implementing its provisions, the Supreme Court found that the
Avena decision was not automatically binding domestic law.78
This decision is further supported by Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter. The provision provides that "[e]ach Member of
the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decisions of the
[I.C.J.] in any case to which it is a party."79 It does not suggest
that the United States is required to comply with an I.C.J. decision,
nor does it indicate that the Senate intended such decisions to have
immediate legal effect on domestic courts.8" Instead, it "reads like
a compact between independent nations that depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the
governments which are parties to it."81 The enforcement provision
of Article 94 adds strength to this argument by providing that the
sole remedy for noncompliance is a referral to the U.N. Security
Council by the aggrieved state, a non-judicial remedy. 82
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that in subscribing to the
75 This distinction was first acknowledged by Chief Justice Marshall. See Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) (assessing the rights of an individual to land ceded from
Spain to France via treaty).
76 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190 (1888)).
77 Id. (citing Ingartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F. 3d 145, 150, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15944, ** 11-** 12 (2005)).
78 Id. at 1357.
79 Id. at 1354 (quoting U.N. CHARTER Art. 94(1)) (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 1358.
81 Id. at 1358-59 (citing Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580,
598 (1884)).
82 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. at 1359-60.
20091
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
U.N. Charter, the United States "retained the unqualified right to
exercise its veto of any Security Council resolution."83 The Court
reasoned that if the I.C.J. judgments were automatically
enforceable as domestic law, "they would be immediately and
directly binding on state and federal courts" and Mexico would not
need to proceed to the Security Council to enforce a judgment.'
Also in support of finding that the Avena decision was not
binding on domestic law, the Court noted that the I.C.J. did not
entitle individuals to bring claims against nations, which was also
addressed in the lower court opinions.85 The Court looked to the
I.C.J. Statute and stated that "the I.C.J. can hear disputes only
between nations, not individuals" and as a result, Medellin cannot
be considered a party to the Avena decision. 86
The Court continued to build support for its findings by
pointing to the "postratification understanding" of signatory
countries.8 7 Under this argument, the Court acknowledged that
while there are numerous nations that are parties to the Vienna
Convention, Medellin was unable to identify "a single nation that
treats I.C.J. judgments as binding in domestic courts."88 "[T]he
lack of any basis for supposing that any other country would treat
I.C.J. judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of their
domestic law strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so
viewed in our courts." 89
Finally, the Court looked to general principles of interpretation
to conclude that the I.C.J. decision was not binding as domestic
law. 9° The Court reasoned that since the forum State's procedural
rules will govern a treaty's implementation unless a clear
statement expresses otherwise, "one would expect the ratifying
parties to the relevant treaties to have clearly stated their intent to
give those judgments domestic effect, if they had so intended."'"
83 Id.
84 Id. at 136.
85 Id. at 1359 (citing Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 281 (2004)).
86 Id. at 1360.
87 Id. at 1363.
88 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. at 1363.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1363-64.
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In the instant case, the Court found no such statement suggesting
that the I.C.J. judgments should displace State procedural rules. 92
The second issue addressed by the Supreme Court was
whether the President's memorandum altered the previous
conclusion that the Avena judgment was not a rule of domestic law
binding in state and federal courts.93 The Court began its analysis
of this issue by discussing Justice Jackson's tripartite scheme for
evaluating executive action94 and acknowledging that "[t]he
President's authority to act, as with the exercise of any
governmental power, must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself."95  While the United States argued
that the President's memorandum was authorized by the U.N.
Charter, the Court recognized that "[t]he responsibility for
transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-
executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress," not the
Executive. "The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress;
the power to execute in the President." 97 Additionally, the United
States argued that the presidential memorandum should have been
given the effect of domestic law because the case involved "a
valid presidential action in the context of Congressional
acquiescence. However, the court failed to find such
Congressional acquiescence in the instant case. 99 Instead, the
Court found that while Congress authorized the President to
represent the United States before the U.N., the I.C.J., and the
Security Council, it did not impart upon the President any
unilateral authority to create domestic law. 100
Finally, the United States claimed that "the Memorandum is a
valid exercise of the President's foreign affairs authority to resolve
92 Id. at 1364.
93 Id. at 1367.
94 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Youngstown), 343 U.S. 579, 635-
38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
95 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585)
(internal quotations omitted).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1369 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)).
98 Id. at 1370.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1371.
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claims disputes with foreign nations."'0 ' The Court noted that
these cases generally entail a narrow set of circumstances which
are "based on the view that a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
before questioned can raise a presumption that the action had been
taken in pursuance of its consent."'0 2 The Court found that the
President's memorandum was not supported by a longstanding
practice of congressional acquiescence0 3 and that the United
States failed to identify a single instance in which the President
had attempted "a Presidential directive issued to state courts, much
less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State's police
powers and compels state courts to re-open final criminal
judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws."1 04  The
Court concluded that presidential authority allowing him to settle
international disputes through executive agreements such as the
memorandum at issue in this case did not stretch so far.105
Following this decision, Medellin sought a stay of execution
which was denied by the Supreme Court on August 5, 2008.106
Three hours after this decision was handed down, Medellin was
put to death. 10
7
Il. Background Law
The precedential holdings leading up to the Medellin decision
provide a diverse approach to the treatment of international
treaties as they relate to domestic law as well as an interesting
perspective on how the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights
has been treated by U.S. courts in the past. The first relevant
historical case is Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64
(1804). In Murray, a United States frigate captured the schooner
Charming Betsy on the open seas under a presidential order
101 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. at 1371.
102 Id. at 1371-72 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981))
(internal quotations omitted) (internal brackets omitted).
103 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003).
104 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1372.
105 Id.
106 Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008) (denying stay of execution).
107 David Stout, Texas Executes Inmate After High Court Steps Aside, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2008 at A16.
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pursuant to the Federal Non-Intercourse Act, which prohibited
trade between France and any person within the United States or
under its protection.'08 The owner of the schooner was born in the
United States but had since become a Danish citizen.109 The
Danish consul questioned the legality of the seizure, reasoning that
it violated long-standing principles of international law." The
U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the seizure was unlawful."'
Specifically, Chief Justice Marshall argued that if a United States
law may conflict with an international obligation, the national law
should be interpreted to avoid such a conflict." 2  His opinion
reflected a contemporary respect for international law and
amicable relations among the United States and other countries." 3
A. The Vienna Convention and the Procedural Default Rule
A more recent case frequently cited among the Medellin and
Avena decisions is that of Breard v. Greene."4 Under the facts of
this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia was scheduled to execute
Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national, after he was found
guilty of the rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie." 5 At the
time of his arrest, Breard was not informed of his right to consular
notification and access for legal guidance even though arresting
officers recognized that he was a foreign national." 6 Evidence at
trial overwhelmingly pointed to Breard's guilt, including semen
and hair found on Dickie's body, matching that of Breard, and his
testimonial confession to the crime. "' Prior to execution, the
108 Michael Franck, The Future of Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy,
Medellin v. Dretke, and The Consular Rights Dispute, 86 B. U. L. REv. 515, 520 (2006)






114 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
115 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 372-73; see also Susan L. Karamanian, Briefly
Resuscitating the Great Writ: The International Court of Justice and the U.S. Death
Penalty, 69 ALB. L. REV. 745, 751 (2006) (discussing the facts of the Breard case and
analyzing it as one of three occasions in which the I.C.J. has been involved with the U.S.
execution system).
116 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4" Cir. 1998).
117 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 373.
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Republic of Paraguay initiated a proceeding against the United
States in the I.C.J., alleging that the United States failed to comply
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. "' After the case was
filed, the I.C.J. ordered the United States to take all measures to
ensure that Breard would not be executed until the court had an
opportunity to decide the case.119 Less than one hour before
Breard's scheduled execution,12 the U.S. Supreme Court denied
Breard's request for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of
execution, finding that, like Medellin, Breard's claim was also
barred as a result of having procedurally defaulted his alleged
claim by not raising it in the state trial court."' The Court
explained, "[t]he procedural default rule prevents a federal court
from reviewing a claim raised in habeas corpus that was not
presented in the state courts in accordance with a state procedural
rule." ' Despite Breard's argument that the Vienna Convention
overshadowed the procedural default rule, the Court held that
while the I.C.J.'s interpretation of the Vienna Convention
deserved "respectful consideration, '  it was subject to the
procedural rules of the forum state. 24 "Absent a clear and express
statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum [S]tate
govern the implementation of the treaty in that [S]tate.' 125
Notably, the Court observed that since the procedural default rule
barred claims under the U.S. Constitution, it should additionally
bar claims arising under a treaty. 126 The Court went on to say that
118 Id. at 374.
119 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. 29 (Apr. 9) (provisional measures), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/99/7601.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
120 Joshua Carpenter, Medellin v. Dretke and the United States' Myopic Failure to
Guarantee the "Full Effect" of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 17 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 515, 526 (2006-2007).
121 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 378-79; see also Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 620.
122 Karamanian, supra note 115, at 751-52 (citing Randy Hertz & James S.
Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 26.1 (4' ed. 2001)).
123 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 375.
124 Karamanaian, supra note 115, at 752.
125 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 375 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
723 (1988); Volkswagenwerk Atkiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988);
Socidt6 Naitonale Industrielle Aropspatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for So. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 539 (1987)).
126 Id. at 376.
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even if Breard's claim had been properly raised, it was unlikely
that the violation would have overturned his conviction without a
showing that the violation prejudiced his trial. 127  The Court
concluded by noting that the Secretary of State had sent a letter to
the Governor of Virginia, requesting that he stay Breard's
execution and that such power was within the Governor's
discretion, if he chose to await the decision of the I.C.J. 128
The United States again faced allegations of acting in violation
of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights in
1999 when Germany initiated I.C.J. proceedings on behalf of two
brothers who had been convicted and sentenced to death on the
charges of first degree murder, attempted murder, attempted
armed-robbery, and kidnapping stemming from a failed bank
robbery. 129 The brothers first raised their Vienna Convention
claim in federal court through the post-conviction process; the
Ninth Circuit held that the claim was procedurally defaulted.
131
Similar to the procedure used in Breard, the I.C.J. entered an order
requesting that LaGrand be granted a stay of execution until the
court had adequate time to reach a decision. 13  Despite these
efforts, the LaGrand brothers were put to death prior to a decision
being reached. Unlike the Breard case, however, Germany
decided to pursue an I.C.J. decision. The United States conceded
that it had denied the brothers the rights required under Article 36
of the Convention and had failed to advise the German consulate
of their arrest. 32 Upon reaching a decision, "the I.C.J. held that
the United States had violated Article 36(1) by not informing the
LaGrand brothers of their rights under Article 36(1) and thus
preventing Germany from providing consular assistance.' 3'  The
Court specifically found that the express language of Article 36,
127 Id. at 377 (citing Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 303 (1991) (discussing the
"harmless error" manner of analysis for coerced confessions)).
128 Id. at 378.
129 LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing State v.
LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565-66 (Ariz. 1987), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998)).
130 Id. at 1261.
131 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Interim Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3).
132 LaGrand (F.RG. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475-76 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/104/7736.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
133 Karamanian, supra note 115, at 753-54 (citing F.R.G. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at
492).
20091
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
providing that "[t]he authorities shall inform the [foreign national]
without delay of his rights," '134 thereby "requires countries to notify
arrested foreign nationals about the possibility of receiving
assistance from their consulates."' 35 Additionally, the I.C.J. found
that while the United States' procedural default rule did not
necessarily violate Article 36, it barred foreign nationals from
invoking their rights under the Vienna Convention when
challenging convictions and sentences. 3 6 As a result, the I.C.J.
denounced the procedural default rule where it would preclude the
future enforcement of Article 36.' The I.C.J. concluded its
opinion by outlining a remedy for the U.S. breach, suggesting that
the United States implement a process of its own design to
"review and reconsider" cases affected by the denial of Vienna
Convention Article 36 rights.'38
B. "Respectful Consideration"
This issue came before the U.S. Supreme Court again in 2006
and, again, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions and
sentences of two foreign nationals despite their claims that the
United States had violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 
139
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican
national, was involved in a shootout with police, during which one
officer sustained a gunshot wound to the leg. 40 Sanchez-Llamas
was later arrested and given a Miranda warning in both English
and Spanish but was never informed that he had the right to notify
the Mexican consulate of his detention or to seek legal guidance
for his case.14 ' Following his arrest, Sanchez-Llamas agreed to an
interrogation by the police and an interpreter, during which he
"made several incriminating statements.' ' 142  Prior to trial,
134 F.R.G. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at 494 (quoting Vienna Convention art. 36(1)(b), Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 Carpenter, supra note 120 at 529 (citing F.R.G. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at 490).
136 Id. (citing F.R.G. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at 515-16).
137 Id. at 529-30 (citing F.R.G. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at 516).
138 F.R.G. v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. at 513-14, 516.
139 See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360 (combining both cases).
140 Id. at 339.
141 Id. at 339-40.
142 Id. at 340.
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Sanchez-Llamas moved to suppress these statements on the
grounds that law enforcement authorities had failed to comply
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.143 His motion was
denied at trial and he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to
over twenty years in prison. " In response to his argument, the
U.S. Supreme Court clarified that evidence excluded in cases cited
by Sanchez-Llamas had "[arisen] out of statutory violations that
indicated important Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests"
(including unconstitutional searches and seizures, arrests in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and involuntary
confessions.).'45 The Court further explained that the failure to
inform a defendant of consular rights is unlikely to produce an
unreliable or coerced confession and is unlikely to give a police
officer any advantage over the accused.'" Ultimately, the two
most frequent and critical concerns-coerced and unreliable
confessions-that arise in the context of evidence exclusion are
negated in so far as they allegedly violate the Vienna
Convention.'47 The Court reminded the defendant that, while he
may not have been protected by the Vienna Convention, he was
guaranteed the constitutional protections afforded all criminal
defendants under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to which Article 36 added very little. 148
In the second combined case, Mario Bustillo, a Honduran
national, was arrested and charged with murder, having been
identified at the scene of the crime without being notified of his
Vienna Convention Article 36 rights."' At the close of his trial,
Bustillo was convicted and sentenced to thirty years in prison. 0
In a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in state court, Bustillo
first raised the Article 36 violation; the court dismissed the claim,
holding that it was procedurally barred given that he had failed to
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 348.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 350.
149 Id. at 340-41.
150 Id. at 341.
2009]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
raise the issue at trial.' 5' In his argument before the Supreme
Court, Bustillo claimed that the I.C.J. held in both the Avena and
LaGrande decisions that the Vienna Convention precludes the
application of the procedural default rule to Article 36 claims, and
thus the Supreme Court decision in Breard should be revisited.152
Citing Breard, the Court noted that while the I.C.J. decisions
deserved "respectful consideration,"' 5 3 they "did not compel [the
Supreme Court] to reconsider their decision under Breard."4 The
Court continued by noting that "nothing in the structure or purpose
of the I.C.J. suggests that its interpretations were intended to be
conclusive on our courts."'55  Additionally, Article 36 made it
clear that the rights provided should be "exercised in conformity
with the laws"' 56 of the forum state - including the procedural
default rule.'57 Finally, the Court also recognized that the decision
of the I.C.J. to disregard the procedural default rule would
frustrate the adversarial process imbued in the U.S. courts and
criminal justice system constructions.'58 As the Court stated,
"procedural default rules are designed to encourage parties to raise
their claims promptly and to vindicate the law's important interest
in the finality of judgments. ' 159  Finding that "respectful
consideration" should be given to I.C.J. decisions and that Breard
should be upheld based upon the plain language of Article 36, the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Bustillo's conviction and sentence.
IV. Significance of the Case
As Jose Medellin sat on death row for fifteen years awaiting a
decision, it likely seemed to him that his case was about the
violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Rights, which granted him, as a foreign national, the right to
151 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 341-42.
152 Id. at 352-53.
153 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 375.
154 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353.
155 Id. at 354.
156 Id. at 356 (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 29, art. 36(1)(b) internal
quotations omitted)).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 357.




contact his consulate upon his arrest and detention in pursuit of
legal assistance. Since his execution, however, this case has not
come to be merely about the Vienna Convention, but instead about
the United States' view on how to apply and enforce international
law, especially when it stands in opposition to domestic procedure.
Throughout its opinions addressing Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed lower court
decisions, finding that such claims arising under the Convention
are deserving of "respectful consideration," 16' but that they are
either procedurally barred under the procedural default rule, 61 are
in contention with the actual language of Article 36, which
requires them to be practiced in conformity with the laws of the
receiving state, 162 or are insignificant in protection compared to the
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. 163  Despite its reasoning
throughout these cases, the Supreme Court found the same result
in each case-international law does not have a binding effect on
domestic law.
A. Reinforcing the Separation of Powers Doctrine
It is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court attempts to
use these decisions to identify, clarify, and reinforce the separation
of powers doctrine. While all of these cases discuss the doctrine,
Medellin, perhaps, provides the best example. In response to
whether the Avena decision had domestic legal effect, the Supreme
Court began its analysis by stating that while treaties constitute an
international law commitment, they do not independently
"function as binding federal law."'" The Court acknowledged that
treaties would not be given the weight of domestic law unless
Congress had enacted statutes that incorporated the treaty or the
treaty independently conveyed an intention to be self-executing. 1
65
The Court found that since the treaty failed to create "binding
federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and
160 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 375.
161 See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 536; Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 375-76.
162 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1364-67; Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356.
163 See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350.
164 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1356.
165 Id. (citing Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir.
2005) (en banc)).
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because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we
conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding
domestic law."' 66 Throughout this line of reasoning, the Court
made a distinct separation between the duties of Congress and
those of the judiciary. The Court reasoned that if a treaty was not
self-executing, it was at the discretion of Congress to enforce it
through statutory implementation. 167 Since this power belonged to
Congress alone, and, in the absence of Congress, either expressly
or impliedly suggesting that the Vienna Convention be given legal
effect, the judiciary explained that it was incapable of acting to
bind the Avena decision on domestic courts.
168
In the Sanchez-Llamas case, the U.S. courts similarly
reinforced the separation between Congress and the Supreme
Court when attempting to determine the most appropriate remedy
for the case. "Where a treaty does not provide a particular
remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal
courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their
own." 169 As in Medellin, the Supreme Court attempted to define
the boundaries of the two branches, asserting that Congress' duty
was to make laws whereas the Court's duty instead was to
interpret them.
While the Court in Medellin recognized that its strict duty was
to interpret laws, it was cautious of this authority, especially in the
face of the dissent's argument to allow the United States to enter
into treaties that were sporadically enforceable. The Court found
that such an undefined treaty would "be the equivalent of writing a
blank check to the judiciary."' 7 ° This would have left senators
unsure of what they were embodying in a statute through their
votes and would have given judges the authority to determine the
meaning at a later date,17" ' essentially giving them both the
simultaneous power to create and interpret the law.'72 The Court
exercised judicial restraint in acknowledging that such a limitation
166 Id. at 1357.
167 Id. at 1356.
168 Id. at 1360.
169 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 347.
170 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1362.
17' Id. at 1362-63.
172 Id. at 1363.
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would inhibit the United States' ability to negotiate, sign and
implement international agreements.'73  Instead, the Court
maintained that the ability of the United States to perform
effectively on an international scale requires a divided and
balanced structure. 74
The Medellin Court further defined presidential duties and
limitations in the second half of the opinion as it concentrated on
the effect and influence of the presidential memorandum. The
Court began this section of the opinion by recognizing that the
President held the primary role in foreign policy as Article II of
the Constitution gave him the "vast share of responsibility for the
conduct of our foreign relations.' ' 75 However, this authority did
not permit the Court to set aside established governing principles
that insist that the President's authority stem from either an act of
Congress or the Constitution directly. 176
The Court continued by reiterating the tripartite scheme of
Presidential power that Justice Jackson originally voiced in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 177 In Youngstown, the
President issued an executive order directing the Secretary of
Commerce to seize and operate a majority of the nation's steel
mills in an effort to avoid a nationwide strike of steel mill
workers. 78 While the mill owners and workers argued that the
President's order amounted to lawmaking, a function reserved to
Congress, the President maintained he was acting under authority
given to him by the Constitution which made him the Nation's
Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 179
The Court eventually held that the President's authority did not
extend so far as expounded by Justice Jackson's three-part scheme
developed in his concurring opinion."s  First, the President's
authority is at its maximum when acting under the express or
implied authorization of Congress because this authority to act
173 Id.
174 Id. at 1362-63.
175 Id. at 1367 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11).
176 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585).
177 Id.
178 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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would include not only the power which was inherent in the
President but also that which can be delegated by Congress.18'
Actions executed under such authorization would be supported by
a strong presumption of validity and afforded wide latitude in
judicial interpretation.182 Second, Jackson noted that "when the
President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority."' 83  In such a situation,
congressional indifference may invite independent Presidential
authority.'84 Jackson acknowledged that, in testing the bounds of
Presidential authority in this circumstance, the outcome will
depend on "imperatives of events" and "contemporary
imponderables" instead of abstract theories of law.'85 Finally, the
President may act in a way that is incompatible with the express or
implied intention of Congress.186 It is here that the President's
power is at its weakest and will be upheld only if a Court chooses
to disable Congress from acting on the subject at hand.'87 The
Court warned that the "[p]residential claim to power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for
what is at stake is the equilibrium of the constitutional system." '88
With this frame of reference, the Court began its analysis of
presidential power by distinguishing presidential power from
congressional power. The Court found that while the President
did have means available to him to enforce international
agreements, he did not have the power to convert a non-self-
executing treaty into a self-executing treaty. 8 9 Instead, the only
governing body that had this discretion was Congress. 190
The Court based its reasoning in the Constitution, noting that
181 Id. at 635.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 637.
184 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 637- 38.
188 Id. at 638.




the President had the authority to make a treaty and if it was
intended to be self-executing, Congress had to approve it by a two-
thirds vote.' 9' A non-self-executing treaty, however, could
become domestic law only once it had passed through legislation,
having been approved by both Houses of Congress and having
received a presidential signature or a congressional override of the
presidential veto. 92  Given this explanation, the Court
demonstrated that the presidential power resided in the execution
of the laws and not in their creation. Due to a lack of evidence of
expressly granting presidential power or congressional
acquiescence, under the Jackson scheme, the presidential
memorandum fell under the third category of presidential
actions, 93 leaving the Court with a presumption that required the
justices to be critical of the President's actions. As a result, the
Supreme Court found that the "Constitution does not contemplate
vesting such power in the Executive alone."' 94  This statement
suggests a specific intent behind a structure that requires the
separation and balance of powers. It implies that the United
States' intention to operate internationally and effectively with
other countries is best served when the government's powers to
control the United States' international presence are clearly
divided, allowing the President to make a treaty, 195 the Senate to
approve and implement the treaty, 196 and the Supreme Court to
interpret the treaty. 19 With this balance of power structure, the
power of the United States remains in the United States and
unaffected by force of outside temptations on any one branch.
B. The Presiding Policy Reason
The fact that the Supreme Court uses this structure to
adjudicate its decisions reinforces the one overwhelming policy
argument that determined the prevalence of domestic law in
Medellin. That policy argument centers around the idea that the




195 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2.
196 Id. art. I.
197 Id. art. 111, § 2.
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United States is not willing to permit an international court to
declare binding decisions on domestic courts without domestic
oversight and review. While the United States feels a strong need
to participate in the international setting, there exists a stronger
desire to protect domestic criminal justice process and procedures
from the imposition of international priorities, such as that of
Mexico's opposition to the death penalty found in Medellin.
According to Julian Ku, an international-law specialist at Hofstra
University in New York, "it would be a dangerous precedent to
allow an international court to tell a state how to manage its
criminal law and procedures without first getting the approval of
federal lawmakers."' 9 s The Court specifically pointed to these
concerns in its response to Medellin, acknowledging that if
Medellin's arguments were accepted, neither the Texas courts nor
the U.S. Supreme Court would have been permitted to look behind
a judgment to question its reasoning or result. 99 "Medellin's
interpretation would allow I.C.J. judgments to override otherwise
binding state law; there is nothing in his logic that would exempt
contrary federal law from the same fate."2" Furthermore, in its
analysis of the presidential memorandum, the Court cited the
government's inability to identify any instance in which the
President attempted a presidential directive issued to state courts,
"much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State's
police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal
judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws.",20 ' The
strength of the language used in this statement infers that state and
federal discretion over criminal adjudication is so central to the
foundation of the United States that the Supreme Court is not
willing to jeopardize those values through the universal imposition
of an international court holding.
This value seems to be such a priority that it overshadows the
additional policy concerns raised by critics of this opinion.
Several individuals spoke out with fear about what this decision
might mean for Americans arrested and detained while traveling
198 Jones, supra note 11.
199 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1364.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1372.
[Vol. XXXV
A FATHER WAITS
abroad.2 °2 An additional concern was that of possible strained
relations between the United States and foreign countries that are
signatories of the Vienna Convention, most specifically Mexico.2 °3
Also, concerns were expressed regarding the ongoing credibility
of the I.C.J. if the United States consistently rejected their
decisions in protection of its own domestic law and procedures. 2°
Despite the weight and significance of each of these concerns, the
U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that the value most in need of
protection is that of domestic law. As a result, all remaining
concerns should be either sacrificed or approached though a
different avenue of foreign policy.
V. Conclusion
By focusing on the separation of powers doctrine and the
Constitutional rights guaranteed to all criminal defendants tried in
both federal and state courts, the Supreme Court overruled the
International Court of Justice, finding that Texas state law would
preside over the Avena decision and Medellin's conviction and
death sentence would stand. While there will likely be an ongoing
discussion of the meaning of this case on an international
platform, this decision established the significance of protecting
the U.S. adversarial process and ensuring that decisions in U.S.
courts are governed by U.S. process and policy, not those of our
international neighbors.
Despite the Supreme Court's reasoning for upholding the
Texas state decision, there has been a movement in the U.S.
legislature to give more force to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Rights. On July 14, 2008, Representative Berman of
California introduced a bill to the House of Representatives that
202 See Carpenter, supra note 120; see also Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1375
(Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that such a breach of an international agreement
would jeopardize the United States' interest in ensuring the reciprocal observance of
rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention); Jones, supra note 11 (citing the
administration's need to ensure that the Vienna Convention's safeguards would continue
to apply to U.S. citizens traveling abroad); Texas Executes Mexican-Born Killer, USA
TODAY, Aug. 6, 2008, httpJ/www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-08-05-
medellinn.htm (acknowledging that this case extends beyond a Mexican national on
death row to Americans who count on consulate protection when they travel abroad)
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
203 See Texas Executes Mexican-Born Killer, supra note 202.
204 See Jones, supra note 11.
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would, if enforced, provide judicial remedies to carry out the U.S.
treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention.2"5  Entitled
"Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008," section 2 of the
legislation reads as follows:
(a) Civil Action- Any person whose rights are infringed by a
violation by any nonforeign governmental authority of article 36
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations may in a civil
action obtain appropriate relief.
(b) Nature of Relief- Appropriate relief for the purposes of this
section means-
(1) any declaratory or equitable relief necessary to secure the
rights ; and
(2) in any case where the plaintiff is convicted of a criminal
offense where the violation occurs during and in relation to the
investigation or prosecution of that offense, any relief required
to remedy the harm done by the violation, including the vitiation
of the conviction or sentence where appropriate.
(c) Application- This Act applies with respect to violations
occurring before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.206
While the Act currently awaits review in the House Judiciary
Committee, if implemented it will change the future of how cases
similar to that of Jose Medellin are addressed as it gives courts the
authority to provide relief for Vienna Convention violations. Had
the Act been passed prior to Medellin's execution, his conviction
may have been invalidated under a finding that such action would
be the only way to remedy the harm done.
If passed, this legislation would suggest that the Vienna
Convention on Consular Rights is such a critical treaty that the
rights promised within it can no longer be denied to foreign
nationals who are arrested and detained within the United States.
More importantly, while it acknowledges the importance of an
international legal responsibility owed by the United States to the
other signatories of the treaty, it places the final decision of
remedy in the hands of United States justices-not foreign courts-
leaving the policy of ensuring that U.S. decisions are governed by
U.S. process and policy insulated from the domination and control




of foreign policy priorities.
While Randy Ertman waited all night for his daughter to arrive
home, days for her body to be found, and years for her case to
finally reach resolution, his waiting and his patience were not
suffered in vain. As a result of his daughter's brutal rape and
murder by a Mexican national who had lived in the United States
for most of his life, Randy Ertman became part of a Supreme
Court decision that will have lasting effects on the landscape of
the United States' approach to international law. Ertman waited
long enough for his resolution. As a result of the Supreme Court
decision in Medellin v. Texas and until definitive legislation is
passed, the waiting now belongs to the families of the foreign
nationals who have been arrested and detained without being
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